Formal Verification of the Cooperative Behaviour of Network Nodes for Routing and Context Dissemination by Georgoulas, S et al.
Future Network & MobileSummit 2012 Conference Proceedings 
Paul Cunningham and Miriam Cunningham (Eds) 
 IIMC International Information Management Corporation, 2012 
                               ISBN: 978-1-905824-30-4
Copyright © 2012 The authors www.FutureNetworkSummit.eu/2012  Page 1 of 9
Formal Verification of the Cooperative 
Behaviour of Network Nodes for Routing 
and Context Dissemination 
Stylianos GEORGOULAS1, Klaus MOESSNER2, Demos ERACLEOUS3, Michele NATI4 
Centre for Communication Systems Research,  
Faculty of Engineering and Physical Sciences, University of Surrey,  
Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7XH, United Kingdom 
1Tel: +441483689488, Fax: +441483686011, Email: s.georgoulas@surrey.ac.uk
2Tel: +441483683468, Fax: +441483686011, Email: k.moessner@surrey.ac.uk
3Tel: +441483689488, Fax: +441483686011, Email: d.eracleous@surrey.ac.uk
4Tel: +4414836001, Fax: +441483686011, Email: m.nati@surrey.ac.uk
Abstract: One of the most fundamental forms of cooperation in any network is the 
cooperation between network nodes for routing and the subsequent context 
dissemination. To do so each node runs an instance of a routing process relying, in 
many cases, only on partial network information rather than network-wide 
information. This can lead to instabilities and problematic situations, such as 
deadlocks or livelocks. Deadlock is a condition where a process stalls; meaning it 
reaches a state from which there is no exit action. When it comes to routing this 
would mean the condition where a packet reaches a node and is not forwarded any 
further because the routing process has reached a state which was not taken into 
account in its behavioural specification. Livelock is a condition from where a 
process can exit; however every exit action will eventually lead the process back to 
the same condition. With respect to routing this would refer to the existence of loops. 
In this paper we show how formal verification, and in particular model checking, can 
be applied in this context; to find such problems and also assess the performance and 
quantify properties of the overall routing process. As an example case study we use a 
routing protocol designed for wireless sensor networks named Adaptive Load 
Balanced Algorithm Rainbow version, suitable for context dissemination in Wireless 
Sensor Network environments, where energy efficient operations are also important. 
Keywords: Formal Verification, Model Checking, Wireless Sensor Networks, 
Routing, Context Dissemination. 
1. Introduction 
One of the most fundamental and “low-level” forms of cooperation in any kind of computer 
networks is the cooperation between network nodes (or routers) for routing purposes; that is 
for finding the most appropriate path according to some predefined metrics from a given 
source to a given destination. In order to do so each node runs an instance of a routing 
process relying, in many cases, only on partial network information provided to it by its 
neighbouring nodes rather than network-wide information. This “in parallel” operation 
which relies only on partial information can lead to instabilities and problematic situations. 
The most notable problematic situations in concurrent systems in general can be either 
deadlocks or livelocks. Deadlock is a condition where a process stalls; meaning it reaches a 
state from which there is no exit action. When it comes to routing this would mean the 
condition where a packet reaches a node and is not forwarded any further because the 
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routing process has reached a state which was not taken into account in its behavioural 
specification. As a result, there is no appropriate exit action to be taken from that state. 
Livelock is a condition from where a process can exit; however every exit action will 
eventually lead the process back to the same condition. With respect to routing this would 
refer to the existence of loops. That is there exists an exit action for every state of the 
routing process at every node; however, one packet after leaving one node will always keep 
being directed back to this same node and never reach its destination. 
In this paper we show how formal verification, and in particular model checking, can be 
applied in this context, to find such problems in routing that may result as a consequence of 
“in parallel” operations that are performed based on partial rather than global network 
information, and also assess the performance and quantify properties of the overall routing 
process. As an example case study we use a routing protocol designed for wireless sensor 
networks (WSNs) named Adaptive Load Balanced Algorithm, Rainbow version (ALBA-R) 
[1] [2]. Such a protocol can be applicable and of interest in networking scenarios that 
require collection and dissemination of context.  Using, for example, the approach and 
adopted terminology of the UniverSelf project [3] as reference, such a protocol can be used 
for context dissemination between context sources (CSs) or content providers (CPs) and 
context clients (CCs) in the context management infrastructure (CMI) [4]. To be more 
specific, in this case the CSs/CPs would be individual WSN nodes sensing some 
information from the user environment, whereas the CCs would be the sinks where the 
individual sensor readings should be delivered and further processed. 
Before proceeding with the description of the protocol itself and its modelling, we very 
briefly introduce the underlying concepts and ideas of formal verification and model 
checking in particular to showcase its difference from the traditional simulation methods. 
2. Formal Verification and Model Checking Concepts 
Formal verification provides a systematic way to assess the correctness of protocols, 
processes and systems. The main difference compared to simulation methods is that instead 
of only examining a limited area of the operational space of the system under consideration, 
it can be used to examine the whole state space of possible operations and conditions under 
which the system may operate. This means that all possible combinations of inputs and 
actions can be taken into account and, therefore, all possible outputs can be derived and 
evaluated. One could regard the outcome of formal verification as the outcome of an 
infinitely large number of simulation runs. This means that contrary to simulations, formal 
verification methods are capable of capturing conditions and operations that may otherwise 
remain unnoticed, even after a very large number of simulation runs. In a similar way, 
formal verification is able to assess the performance and quantify properties of processes 
with a degree of confidence not possible through simulation runs.  
In general there are two approaches in formal verification [5]. The first one is to try to 
prove the correctness of a system and derive its properties through a sequence of theorems; 
this is called theorem proving. This process however is very cumbersome in practice and 
the more complicated the system the harder it becomes to use theorems to prove its 
correctness. The second approach is called model checking. In this approach the behaviour 
of the system under consideration is modelled using the description language of the model 
checker and then the model checker examines all possible system evolutions based on the 
model. That is model checking itself does not try to “understand” the behaviour of the 
system but is able to output the outcomes of its behaviour under all possible circumstances 
and check all of the outcomes with respect to the meeting or violation of properties of 
interest. The main limitation of model checking is the state explosion problem; as the size 
of the system and the parameters under consideration increase so do the number of states 
and transitions between states. To account for this the model of the system should be 
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carefully constructed, omitting operations and features that are not of interest and by 
“abstracting” appropriately the operations that need to be included in the model. In addition 
there exist some proposals in the literature on how to scale the applicability of model 
checking by breaking down large systems into smaller ones, model checking the smaller 
systems and combining the results to derive the correctness (or faultiness) and properties of 
the larger system. This approach is known as compositional verification [6] [7]. 
In model checking, four main types of models are commonly used, depending on the 
characteristics of the system to be modelled and analysed; these are Discrete-time Markov 
Chains (DTMCs), Markov Decision Processes (MDPs), Continuous-time Markov Chains 
(CTMCs), and Continuous-time Markov Decision Processes (CTMDPs). Decision 
Processes extend Chains to account for non-deterministic behaviour; that is behaviour 
where the transition probabilities cannot be clearly defined. For example, probabilities for 
transitions triggered by external factors at random instances or incurred due to 
poor/unknown behavioural specification. In the first two models, all transitions take place 
in discrete (time) steps whereas in the latter two, time is modelled in a continuous manner. 
The model checking tool used in this work is the PRISM model checker tool [8] which has 
been successfully used for model checking a variety of protocols and systems in general. 
3. ALBA-R Specification 
In the ALBA-R protocol, every node that needs to transmit a packet (either a packet it 
generated itself or a packet from another node for which it is acting as a relay) it can do so 
either towards the nodes closer to the sink than it or to nodes further away from the sink 
than it. Every time such a node needs to transmit a packet it first broadcasts a control packet 
that indicates its “colour” and its distance from the sink (Geographic Priority Index - GPI) 
and asks from eligible relays to respond with their GPI and their congestion status (Queue 
Priority Index - QPI). It is worth mentioning that for energy saving reasons nodes follow an 
ON-OFF duty cycle (set to 10% in [1] [2]) which means that it is not always the case that 
eligible relays within the transmission range of another node will respond. To account for 
this every node can make a number of broadcast reattempts up to N whenever it is in a state 
where it looks for eligible relays, before conceding that no eligible relays can be found 
because they do not actually exist (dead end situation). 
The selection of the direction for transmission depends on the colour C of the node. 
Initially all of the nodes of the topology are considered to be yellow, C0, and they try to 
route packets towards the sink; that is to nodes with lower GPI than them (positive 
advancement). Eligible relays for yellow nodes are only other yellow nodes. In case a node 
realises that it cannot send to a yellow node, even after all reattempts are over, it backs off, 
changes colour to C1, which means red and tries to find eligible relays in the reverse 
direction of the sink (negative advancement). Eligible relays in the case where the node has 
become red can only be red or yellow nodes. Not always, however, yellow or red nodes can 
be found so the node is forced again after the number of reattempts to change its colour to 
C2, which means blue. According to its new colour the node tries to find a best relay 
offering positive advancement and nodes which have blue or red colour are candidate relays 
towards the sink. So, any packet generated by a blue node will travel through blue nodes 
towards the sink until it reaches a red node. Then red nodes will advance the packet in the 
reverse direction to red nodes until they reach a yellow node and then normal operations 
will be performed until the packet is delivered to the sink.  
This process can be generalised to any number of nodes the main principles being that: 
a) when a node has an even number colour it can only look for relays offering positive 
advancement whereas if it has an odd number colour it can only look for relays offering 
negative advancement, b) eligible relays for a node with colour CN are only nodes with 
colour CN  or CN-1 colour with nodes with colour CN-1  having priority over nodes with colour 
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CN and, c) among eligible nodes based on colour criteria, the nodes with lower QPI or with 
lower GPI -in case of nodes with the same QPI- have priority to be selected as relays. It was 
shown in [1] that the second principle can guarantee loop-free operations, meaning that the 
ALBA-R protocol, irrespective of its other properties, does not suffer from livelocks.   
4. ALBA-R Modelling Process and Assumptions 
In this section we explain how the PRISM model checker was used in this work to model 
the ALBA-R protocol and what assumptions were made when constructing the model. 
First, the number of the nodes that the network topology would consist of had to be 
decided, as well as their connectivity based on the transmission range of the nodes. It was 
decided that a sparse network topology would be modelled in order to check the correctness 
and properties of the ALBA-R protocol in such a networking scenario where each node 
would have only one or two directly attached nodes to it in the direction towards or away 
from the sink. Such an environment would be challenging for the ALBA-R protocol due to 
the very limited routing options. If the protocol performs well in such a topology then in 
topologies with nodes having many more neighbours it can only be expected to perform 
better since the chances of successful transmissions increase. In addition, for simplicity, the 
number of nodes in the topology was kept to the minimum that would still allow though for 
all the operations of the protocol to be examined; most notably the ability to back off, 
change colours, as well as have more than one potential paths to the sink. Therefore, the 
considered network topology is shown below in Figure 1 (each node can see due to 
transmission power constraints only the nodes that are connected to it with a black line). 
Figure 1. Modelled network topology and assigned GPI values. 
We set the number of colours a node can take equal to three (yellow=0, red=1, blue=2) 
and we also assumed the minimum time unit is 10msec, which corresponds to the time 
needed for a control packet to be broadcasted and a reply for it to be received. This time 
unit was derived based on the packet size and channel rate used in [2]. All other time 
intervals were expressed as multiples of this basic time unit. More specifically the ON 
period of a node was set to 3 time units and the OFF period of a node was set to 27 time 
units so that we had a 10% duty cycle as in [1] [2]. We considered that only node #1 wants 
to transmit a packet to the sink. Since only one packet needs to be transmitted, the QPI 
functionality did not have to be included in the model. For simplicity reasons we also 
assumed that node #1 starts from the state where it is ready to start broadcasting the control 
packet (that is it has just collected the sensed information, wrapped it into a packet and 
needs to deliver it to the sink), nodes #2-7 can start from any time instance within their OFF 
period whereas the remaining node #8 can start from the beginning of its OFF period. The 
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transitions afterwards, corresponding to packet transitions and time progression within the 
duty cycles, are synchronised over the 10msec basic unit; this allowed us to build the model 
as a DTMC. It is worth noting that these assumptions with respect to the initial conditions 
of the nodes led to 387,420,489 initial states. This means that the results of model checking 
would correspond to this number of distinct simulation runs.  
The parameter that was left as a variable and for different values of which, the model 
was built and checked for properties was the number of the broadcast reattempts. Once 
these modelling details were fixed the state diagrams that define the behaviour of the 
protocol at each node were created and based on these the corresponding overall model was 
created using PRISM’s specification language. As an example, Figure 2 illustrates the state 
diagram for node #1 (the source).  
Figure 2. State diagram for the source node #1. 
5. Model Checking Results 
The first property that was model checked was the probability of the packet reaching the 
sink as a function of the number of broadcast reattempts. As Figure 3 shows, and as 
expected, as the number of broadcast reattempts increases, the probability of the packet 
reaching the sink also increases. This is due to the reason that when a node is trying to 
reach its eligible relays it may not find them during its first attempts since the eligible relays 
for this node can be at the OFF period of their duty cycle; it will require therefore more 
reattempts. Starting from 10 reattempts it can be seen that the average probability of 
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reaching the sink through any possible path is 0.46 reaching eventually the value 1; 
increasing the number of reattempts to more than 30 has therefore further no effect on it.  
Figure 3. Probability of packet reaching the sink as function of number of broadcast reattempts.  
The second property that was examined was the probability of a packet reaching the 
sink as a function of time. Figure 4 shows this probability against time for number of 
reattempts equal to 4 and 15 respectively. 
Figure 4. Probability of packet reaching the sink within a certain time interval.  
As it can be seen, for increasing number of reattempts the probability of a packet 
reaching the sink within a given time period increases. This is because increasing the 
number of reattempts decreases the likelihood of backing off, which would then involve 
looking for eligible relays in the reverse direction and potentially resulting in following 
longer paths towards the sink which would not meet the time constraints. However, for very 
low time intervals these probabilities almost match since the only way to meet the strict 
time deadline is if the nodes find eligible relays within a very low number of reattempts -
even lower than 4; increasing therefore the number of reattempts has no big effect. 
As a third property of interest we evaluated the average energy consumed by the 
network of sensor nodes as a whole for the successful transmission of a packet from node 
#1 to the sink when the number of broadcast reattempts is set equal to 30 and it follows the 
paths Path 1 (node #1 – node #2 – node #7 – sink), Path 2 (node #1 – node #3 – node #4 – 
node 6 – node #8 – sink), and Path 3 (node #1 – node #3 – node #4 - node  #6 – node #5 –
node #7 – sink)  respectively, normalised over the energy spent when Path 1 is followed. 
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Figure 5 shows this taking into account the energy consumption values of nodes per 
operation mode (transmitting, receiving, idle, sleep) as in [1]. As it can be seen, the energy 
spent along Path #3 is higher than the energy spent along Path #2 due to the bigger length 
of Path #3. The energy for both these paths is much higher than the energy spent along Path 
#1; this is not only due to their bigger length but also due to the fact that the nodes along 
Path #2 and Path #3 have to go through the process of changing their colours accordingly to 
proceed with the transmissions along these two paths. 
Figure 5. Average energy spent along the 3 paths.  
6. Discussion 
The results of model checking showed that the ALBA-R protocol -given the modelling 
assumptions- can perform as intended and guarantee the proper delivery of packets from 
context sources to context sinks in WSN environments, even if the topology is very sparse 
with nodes having only one or two neighbouring nodes, by setting the number of broadcast 
reattempts to an appropriately high value. As we also showed it is possible to deduce on 
various properties of the protocol; for example what is the probability of the packet delivery 
to the sink and how long it will take as well as how much energy it will be consumed in that 
process. Many more properties can be quantified, but are not shown here due to page 
limitations, e.g. with what probability a packet will stall at a specific node.  
It is also worth mentioning that not only average values of properties can be derived but 
also absolute minimum and maximum values, corresponding to the absolute best and worst 
case scenarios respectively (or vice versa). While the modelled topology is relatively small 
it still allows for all protocol operations to “kick-in” and be examined; and small topologies 
can highlight interesting behaviour that may also occur in larger configuration [9].  
Based on the outcomes of model checking, the administrator of a WSN running ALBA-
R as the routing protocol can know beforehand and with a very high degree of confidence 
what kind of performance they can anticipate when they actually roll out a network 
configuration and even select the protocol’s parameters beforehand so as to achieve certain 
performance objectives related to packet delivery ratio, time needed for packet delivery, 
energy consumption, etc. If, for example, a WSN administrator needs packets to reach their 
sink with a certain overall probability and -also- with a certain probability to reach it within 
a certain time interval, it is possible to know beforehand if there exists a value for the 
number of broadcast reattempts that meets these requirements  
It is also worth noting that while in this current work we do not propose any 
modifications to the ALBA-R protocol or benchmark it against other routing protocols, the 
findings of this modelling and verification methodology could help the creators of the 
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ALBA-R protocol to identify possible shortcomings in its behavioural specification, 
consider amendments and verify the outcome of these modifications. In addition, if the 
same methodology is applied to other routing protocols then a direct comparison of their 
relative performance can be made and a WSN administrator would be able to adopt the 
most appropriate routing protocol for their specific network configuration, according to 
whichever metrics are considered each time as being the most important. 
7.  Conclusions and Future Work 
As we showed in this paper, through model checking it is possible -with a very high degree 
of confidence- to deduce on the correctness and properties of the ALBA-R protocol. 
Average as a well as absolute best/worst case behaviours can be assessed; it is also possible 
to track down the sequence of operations that led to a specific problematic situation, 
meaning that a protocol designer can also understand why a problematic situation occurred 
and consider amendments to the protocol’s specification to overcome this. 
 Model checking as an approach is very generic; the same modelling principles can be 
applied to other processes as long as the interactions between them can be defined and the 
state diagrams with their states and transitions can be created. As an example one may 
consider that the nodes presented in Figure 1 do not correspond to wireless sensor nodes but 
to networking entities running the same or different interacting processes. As long as the 
interactions can be defined, model checking can be applied and deduce whether the set of 
these networking processes will eventually converge to something that is considered as a 
stable and desired situation, as well as how long -even in the worst case scenario- it will 
take for this to happen. In a similar way it is possible to deduce whether an unstable 
condition and oscillatory behaviour due to lack of convergence may occur and also reason 
about the sequence of operations that led to this so as to consider altering the specifications 
of the interacting processes or limit -if possible and needed- the range of interactions. 
This latter mentioned capability is our planned future work in the context of the 
UniverSelf project within the project’s use case dedicated to this [10] (Use Case 2: 
Networks’ Stability and Performance); that is interacting network processes of interest will 
be identified and model checked for their joint behaviour and performance against stability 
related metrics and objectives.  
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